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Abstract—The requirement for higher quality and seamless 
development of systems is continuously increasing, even in 
domains traditionally not deeply involved in such issues. 
Security and Dependability (S&D) requirements are 
incorporated to an increasing number of systems. These newer 
restrictions make the development of those systems more 
complicated than conventional systems. In our work, we 
promote a new approach called SEMCO (System and software 
Engineering with Multi-COncerns) combining Model-Driven 
Engineering (MDE) with a model-based repository of S&D 
patterns to support the design and the analysis of pattern-
based secure and dependable system and software 
architectures.
The modeling framework to support the approach is based on a 
set of modeling languages, to specify security and dependability 
patterns, resources and a set of property models, and a set of 
model transformation rules to specify some of the analysis 
activities. As part of the assistance for the development of S&D 
applications, we have implemented a tool-chain based on the 
Eclipse platform to support the different activities around the 
repository, including the analysis activities. The proposed 
approach was evaluated through a case study from the railway 
domain.
Keywords— Security, Dependability, Resource, Pattern, 
Model-driven Engineering, Embedded Systems Engineering.
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decades, the systems have grown with an 
increasing in terms of complexity and connectivity. In the past 
Security and Dependability (S&D) was not such a critical 
concern of system development teams, since it was possible to 
rely on the fact that a system could be easily, controlled due to 
its limited connectivity and, in most of the cases, its dedicated 
focus. However, nowadays, systems are growing in terms of 
complexity, functionality and connectivity not only in safety-
critical areas (defense, nuclear power generation, etc.), but 
also in areas such as finance, transportation, medical 
information management and system using web applications.
Just consider Resource Constrained Embedded Systems 
(RCES) [1] and their added complexity and connectivity. The 
aforementioned challenges in modern system development 
push the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
community to search for innovative methods and tools for 
serving these new needs and objectives. Regarding system 
security and dependability, in the cases of modern systems, the 
“walled-garden” paradigm is unsuitable and the traditional 
security and dependability concepts are ineffective, since it 
was based on the fact that it is possible to build a wall between 
the system and the outer world. In our opinion the foundation 
for comprehensive security and dependability engineering is a 
deep understanding of the modern systems, ongoing or 
previous security and dependability incidents and their 
implications on the underlying critical infrastructure.
The industrial context conducting our work is how to take 
into account several constraints, mainly those related to 
security and dependability, that are not satisfied by the well-
known and the widely used technology for building 
applications for Resource-Constrained Embedded Systems. 
These requirements introduce conflicts on the three main 
factors that determine the cost of ownership of applications: (a) 
cost of the production, (b) cost of engineering and (c) cost of 
maintenance. In other words, systems with high dependability 
requirements for which the security level must be 
demonstrated and certified use almost exclusively technical 
solutions strongly oriented by the application domains. 
Applications based on these solutions are by definition 
dedicated, hardly portable between different execution 
platforms and require specific engineering processes. These 
specificities greatly increase the cost of the development in the 
different phases of their lifecycle.
Embedded systems share a large number of common 
characteristics, including real-time and physical constraints 
(e.g. temperature), as well as energy efficiency requirements. 
Specifically, Resource Constrained Embedded Systems refer 
to systems which have memory and/or computational 
processing power constraints computing resources of RCES, 
e.g. memory, tasks, and buffers, are generally statically 
determined. The generation of RCES therefore involves 
specific software building processes. These processes are often 
error-prone because they are not fully automated, even if some 
level of automatic code generation or even model driven 
engineering support is applied. Furthermore, many RCES also 
have assurance requirements, ranging from very strong levels 
involving certification (e.g. DO178 and IEC-61508 for safety-
relevant embedded systems development) to lighter levels 
based on industry practices. Consequently, the conception and 
design of RCES is an inherently complex endeavor. To cope 
with the growing complexity of embedded system design, 
several development approaches have been proposed. The 
most popular are those using models as main artifacts to be 
constructed and maintained.
In embedded system design field, the integration of non-
functional requirements from Security and Dependability 
(S&D) [2], [3] are exacerbating this complexity, mainly in the 
context of trade-offs. For instance, in the automotive domain, 
a car may need to have secure communication mechanisms for 
secure download or for secure data transfer. In the railway 
domain, a supervision system needs to have secure 
communication mechanisms to be able to activate the 
emergency brake when something goes wrong. The 
development of systems with security and dependability 
requires specialized expertise and skills. The cost of designing 
such features from scratch could easily exceed the cost of the 
rest of the system. For example (see Fig. 1), the development 
of a security component for a railway signaling system 
requires expertise in security that is seldom available in the 
railway industry and it requires expertise in the engineering 
process and validation practices of railway which are not 
always available in the S&D community. In fact, capturing 
and providing this expertise by the way of security and 
dependability patterns can support the integration of S&D 
features by design to foster reuse during the process of 
software system development. Patterns are specified and 
validated by security and dependability experts and stored in a 
repository to be reused as security and dependability building 
block function by software engineer in several domains.
Fig. 1. Patterns for engineering systems with security and dependability 
requirements
Recent times have seen a paradigm shift in terms of design 
by combining multiple software engineering paradigms, 
namely, Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) [4] and 
Component Based Software Engineering (CBSE) [5]. Such a 
paradigm shift is changing the way systems are developed 
nowadays, reducing development time significantly. 
In our work, we promote a new discipline for systems 
engineering around a model-based repository of modeling 
artifacts using a pattern as its first class citizen: Pattern-based 
System Engineering (PBSE). The proposed approach called 
SEMCO for System and software Engineering with Multi-
COncern
1
addresses two kinds of processes: the process of 
modeling artifacts development and system development with 
modeling artifacts. Therefore, we add a repository as a tier 
which acts as intermediate agent between these two processes. 
1
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A repository should provide a modeling container to support 
modeling artifacts lifecycle associated with different 
methodologies. The patterns that are at the heart of our system 
engineering process reflect design solutions at domain 
independent and specific level, respectively. 
II.BACKGROUND
A. Incorporating  Security  and  Dependability  in  System 
Engineering
In system engineering, security and dependability may be 
compromised in several system layers. Usually, security is 
considered when design decisions are made leading to 
potential conflicting situations. The integration of security and 
dependability features requires the availability of system 
architecture expertise, application domain specific knowledge 
and security expertise at the same time to manage the potential 
consequences of design decisions on the security of a system 
and on the rest of the architecture. For instance, at 
architectural level, incorporating security means to have a 
mechanism (it may be a component or integrated into a 
component). Development processes for system and software 
construction are common knowledge and mainstream practice 
in most development organizations. Unfortunately, these 
processes offer little support in order to meet security and 
dependability requirements. Over the years, research efforts 
have been invested in methodologies and techniques for secure 
and dependable software engineering, yet dedicated processes 
have been proposed only recently, namely OWASP’s CLAS
2
,
Microsoft’s SDL
3
and McGraw’s Touchpoints
4
.
In SEMCO, our aim is (1) to identify the commonalities, 
discuss the specificity of each approach, and (2) to evaluate 
the integration of the SEMCO outcomes in these process 
models. The overall goal in SEMCO is to support any security 
and dependability engineering process.
B. Pattern-Based Development
Patterns are widely used today to provide architects and 
designers with reusable design knowledge. They refer to 
triples that describe solutions for commonly occur- ring 
problems in specific contexts. There are patterns for generic 
architecture problems [6], for security [7] and for other non-
functional requirements.
Pattern-based development has gained more attention 
recently in software engineering by addressing new challenges 
that are not targeted in the past. In fact, they are applied in 
modern software architecture for distributed systems including 
middlewares [8], and real-time embedded systems [9], and 
recently in security and dependability engineering [7]. The 
related approaches promote the use of patterns in the form of 
reusable design artifacts.
The supporting research activities in PBSE examine three 
distinct challenges: (a) mining (discovering patterns from 
existing systems), (b) hatching (selection of the appropriate 
pattern); (c) application (effective use during the system 
development process). These three challenges often involve 
2
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widely diverse core expertise including formal logic, 
mathematics, stochastic modeling, graph theory, hardware 
design and software engineering.
In our work, we study only the two last challenges, 
targeting the (i) development of an extendible design language 
for modeling patterns for secure and dependable distributed 
embedded systems [10] and (ii) a methodology to improve 
existing development processes using patterns [11]. The 
language has to capture the core elements of the pattern to 
help its (a) precise specification, (b) appropriate selection and 
(c) seamless integration and usage. The first aspect is pattern-
definition oriented while the second and the third aspects are 
more problem-definition oriented.
Usually, these design artifacts are provided as a library of 
models (sub-systems) and as a system of patterns (framework) 
in the more elaborated approaches. However, there are still 
lacks of modeling languages and/or formalisms dedicated to 
specify these design artifacts and the way how to reuse them 
in software development automation. More precisely, a gap 
between the development of systems using patterns and the 
pattern information still exists.
The SEMCO vision is to use S&D and architecture patterns 
and their interactions as parameters for the computation, 
analysis, selection and development of secure and dependable 
system and software architectures.
C. Model Driven Engineering (MDE)
MDE has the potential to greatly ease daily activities of 
S&D experts.  In fact, MDE supports the designer to specify in 
a separate way S&D requirements issues at a greater 
abstraction level. MDE promotes models as first class 
elements. A model can be represented at different levels of 
abstraction and the MDE vision is based on (1) the 
metamodeling techniques to describe these models and (2) the 
mechanisms to specify the relations between them. Model 
exchange is within the heart of the MDE methodology as well 
as the transformation/refinement relation between two models. 
Domain Specific Modeling Languages (DSML) [12] in 
software engineering is used as a methodology using models 
as first class citizens to specify applications within a particular 
domain. There are several DSML environments, one of them 
being the open- source Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) 
[13]. EMF provides an implementation of EMOF (Essential 
MOF), a subset of the Meta Object Facility (MOF)
5
, called 
Ecore. EMF offers a set of tools to specify metamodels in 
Ecore and to generate other representations of them. Query 
View Transformation (QVT)
6
is a standard to specify model 
transformations in a formal way, between metamodels 
conforming to MOF.
In the context of SEMCO, design decisions are one of 
the most important artefacts during architecting. Models of 
both security and dependability decisions and other 
architecture concerns decisions need to be complete, and need 
to be specified precisely and traced to other models.  The 
SEMCO vision is that metamodeling and model 
transformation, within MDE (specification, design, analysis, 
implementation, test), allows reducing time/cost of 
understanding and analyzing system artefacts description due 
5
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to the abstraction mechanisms and reducing the cost of 
development process thanks to the generation mechanisms.
III. THE SEMCO APPROACH
A. Objectives
SEMCO (System and software Engineering with Multi-
COncern) aims at developing a model and pattern-based 
modeling framework for handling security and dependability 
for system and software architecture that semi-automatically 
supports the analysis and evaluation of secure and dependable 
architectures for verification and validation purposes, 
providing the subsequent re-design that optimizes both.
The framework provides several artifacts types representing 
different engineering concerns (Security, Dependability, 
Safety and Resources) and architectural information. These 
artifacts are stored in a model-based repository and provided 
in the form of modeling languages (SEMCO-ML), tools 
(SEMCO-MDT) and methods (SEMCO-PM). The nearest goal 
of SEMCO is going to contribute on “Understanding System 
and software Engineering with security and dependability 
features by design in resource constrained systems”.
B. Our Approach Through an Example: The Stakeholders
We propose a solution based on the reuse of software 
subsystems that have been pre-engineered to adapt to a 
specific domain. In order to understand our security and
dependability engineering framework with patterns better, we 
provide a description of a one usage scenario.
In the example of Fig. 2, first a security expert develops a 
security subsystem called pattern. The security expert focuses 
mainly on security solution development in the form of 
patterns elements or mining patterns from existing systems. 
Next a software engineering expert adapts the pattern to 
engineering reuse. The main output of this activity is a 
specification of a pattern in suitable format for repository 
storage, to enforce reuse during system and software 
development processes. The activity of creating the blue 
artifacts is performed by the software engineer in collaboration 
with the security expert.  The achieved role can be called a 
security and dependability pattern engineer. Then a domain 
process expert, for instance a railway domain expert adapts the 
security pattern into a version that is usable in the railway 
system development process, ensuring compliance of these 
artifacts with appropriate standards and that other engineering 
artifacts are available throughout each phase of a development 
process, creating the red artifacts.
Moreover, with the help of a software engineering expert, 
the pattern and its associated artifacts should be transformed 
into a version (green artifacts) that is adapted to the railway 
development environment. The activity of reusing the red 
artifacts is performed by dedicated tools that are customized 
for a given software engineering environment (development 
platform). Finally, a domain engineer, for instance a railway 
system and software developer reuses the resulting adapted 
and transformed pattern (green artifacts) to develop a railway 
system.
Fig.2.  Our approach through an example: The Stakeholders
C. Conceptual
The SEMCO foundation is a model-based repository of 
modeling artifacts, including pattern, resource and property 
models and thereby supporting a pattern-based development 
methodology. The pattern is the first class citizen of these 
modeling artifacts to describe security and dependability 
solutions. The resource will capture the computing system 
platform and the property will allow to govern the use of 
patterns and to evaluate their security level for analysis for 
reuse. Specifically, we tend to overlook the three rules that 
govern pattern-based system development (1) the specification 
of these artifacts at different levels of abstraction, (2) the 
specification of relationships that govern their interactions and 
complementarity and the specification of the relationship 
between patterns and other artifacts manipulated during the 
development lifecycle and those related to the assessment of 
critical systems. It is a good application and promotion of 
model- driven engineering.
In SEMCO, a pattern is a subsystem dedicated to security 
and dependability aspects [14], to be specified by a security 
and dependability experts, and reused by domain engineers to 
improve systems/software engineering facing security and 
dependability requirements.
The core of SEMCO is a set of DSMLs, a repository, search 
and transformations engines. The DSMLs are devoted to 
specify patterns, a system of patterns and a set of models to 
govern their use, and thereby to organize, analyze, evaluate 
and finally validate the potential for reuse. In order to enforce 
reuse and to interconnect the process of the specification of 
these modeling artifacts and the system development with 
these artifacts, we developed a structured model-based 
repository to store these artifacts. Therefore, instead of 
defining new modeling artifacts, that usually are time and 
effort consuming as well as error prone, the system developer 
merely needs to select appropriate patterns from the repository 
and integrate them in the system under development. This is 
the role of search and transformation engines, where an 
artifact is identified/ selected from a repository and then the 
results are transformed towards specific domain development 
environments such as UML.
Fig. 3. The SEPM metamodel -Overview
IV. TECHNICAL FOUNDATION
The SEMCO vision is to create an integrated set of soft-
ware tools to enable S&D RCES applications development by 
design, with the following objectives:
? The tools will improve the design, implementation, 
configuration and deployment of S&D RCES 
applications through:
- Best-practice design methods: patterns and 
models
- Innovative modeling and optimization techniques: 
Model Driven Engineering (MDE), Domain 
Specific Modeling Languages (DSML),
- To foster reuse in multiple domains: repository.? The tools will target multiple stakeholders in the 
RCES markets.? The tools will provide and manage all interfaces with 
a common and evolving underlying core models and 
technologies.
As introduced in the previous section, security and 
dependability pattern engineer and the domain specific 
engineer use a number of tools. Those tools, based on model 
driven engineering techniques to create and then to reuse 
information that is stored in an engineering repository.
We now present an overview of our modeling framework 
building process as:
? SEMCO-ML: a set of DSMLs for the specification of 
the SEMCO modeling artifacts.? SEMCO-MDT: a set of tools to support the SEMCO
methods, the specification of the SEMCO modeling 
artifacts and the repository system.? SEMCO-PM: a set of methodologies for the 
description of the PBSE methods.
Additional and detailed information will be provided during 
the implementation of the related design environment. Then, 
we detail the description of the integrated process used for the 
development of the Safe4Rail application in Section V.
A. SEMCO-ML
To foster reuse of patterns in the development of critical 
systems with S&D requirements, we are building on a 
metamodel for representing S&D patterns in the form of
subsystems providing appropriate interfaces and targeting 
S&D properties. Interfaces will be used to exhibit the pattern’s 
functionality in order to manage its application. In addition, 
interfaces support interactions with security primitives and 
protocols, such as encryption, and specialization for specific 
underlying software and/or hardware platforms, mainly during 
the deployment activity.
The System and software Pattern Metamodel (SEPM) is a 
metamodel defining a new formalism for describing patterns, 
while the Generic Property Metamodel (GPRM) is used to 
specify property model libraries to define the S&D and 
resource properties of the patterns. The principal classes of the 
SEPM metamodel are described with the Ecore notation in Fig. 
3. In the following, we detail the meaning of principal 
concepts used to edit a pattern.? SepmPattern. This block represents a modular part of a 
system representing a solution of a recurrent problem. A 
SepmPattern is defined by its behavior and by its 
provided and required interfaces. A SepmPattern may be 
manifested by one or more artifacts, and in turn, that 
artifact may be deployed to its execution environment. 
The SepmPattern has attributes to describe the related 
recurring design problem that arises in specific design 
contexts.
Fig. 4. The tool flow architecture
? SepmInternalStructure. Constitutes  the  implementation  
of  the  solution  proposed  by  the  pattern.  Thus the 
InternalStructure can be considered as a white box 
which exposes the details of the pattern.? SepmInterface. A pattern interacts with its environment
with Interfaces which are composed of Operations. We 
consider two kinds of interface: 
(1) SepmExternalInterface for  specifying  interactions 
with  regard  to  the  integration  of  a  pattern  into an  
application  model  or  to  compose  patterns,  and
(2) SepmTechnicalInterface for specifying interactions 
with the platform.? SepmProperty. Is a particular characteristic of a pat- tern 
related to the concern dealing with and dedicated to 
capture its intent in a certain way. Each property of a 
pattern will be validated at the time of the pattern 
validation process and the assumptions used will be 
compiled as a set of constraints which will have to be 
satisfied by the domain application.
In addition to defining pattern artifacts, our pattern 
metamodel provides a way to formalize an S&D Pattern 
System, as a set of S&D patterns and their potential 
relationships, that enables an incremental support of our PBSE  
framework.
The Generic Property (GPRM) metamodel captures the 
common concepts of the two main concerns of trusted RCES 
applications: Security, Dependability and Resource on the one 
hand and Constraints on these properties on the other hand. 
The libraries of properties and constraints include units, types 
and categories. For instance, security and dependability 
attributes [5] such as authenticity, confidentiality and 
availability are categories of S&D properties. These categories 
require a set of measures types (degree, metrics…) and units 
(boolean, float…).
B. SEMCO-MDT
The tool-suite to support the SEMCO approach has to 
provide the following features:? Repository life cycle: Allow the management of the 
repository, including deployment, set-up and 
organization.? Modeling artefact life cycle: Provide the ability to 
editing S&D patterns and models, their validation, and 
their deposit in repository (DEP).? System life cycle: Provide the ability to retrieve S&D 
patterns and models from repository (RET) by querying 
the repository, instantiate and integrate the results.
Using the proposed metamodels, the Eclipse Modeling 
Framework (EMF), and a CDO-based repository
7
ongoing 
experimental work is conducted with semcomdt (Semco 
Model Development Tools, IRIT’s editor plugins) to produce 
an MDE Tool-chain, such as visualized in Fig. 4, supporting 
the approach. semcomdt provides a set of software tools, for 
instance for the design and for populating the repository and 
for retrieval and transform from the repository. For accessing 
the repository, semcomdt provides a set of facilities to help 
selecting appropriate patterns including keyword search, 
lifecycle stage search and property categories search. 
7
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Currently the tool suite is provided as Eclipse  plugins.  For 
more details, the reader is referred to  [15].
The following tools to perform the activities of management 
and populating the repository were developed:? Gaya: a repository based on MDE technology was 
developed. This repository allows to store engineering 
and process knowledge associated with S&D patterns.? Arabion: a tool for editing S&D patterns. These 
patterns must be stored in such a way that they can be 
reused   later, enhanced and modified.? Tiqueo: a tool for editing S&D properties and 
constraints. The focus is on the non-functional
requirements that are associated with S&D patterns.
Moreover, a set of dedicated tools that are customized 
for a given software engineering environment (development 
platform) were developed: Access tools for Safe4Rail. The 
tool transforms the Gaya representation of S&D patterns 
into a representation that is consistent with the Safe4Rail set 
of tools (mostly Rhapsody UML-based) and the Safe4Rail 
process.
C. SEMCO-Methodology: From Pattern Repository to Sys-
tem Development
Along this description, we will give the main keys to 
understand why our process is based on a generic, incremental 
and a constructive approach. Once the repository
8
is available, 
it serves an underlying trust engineering process. In the 
process model visualized in Fig. 5 (the numbers in parentheses 
correspond to the numbers in Fig. 5), as activity diagram, the 
developer starts by system specification (A1) fulfilling the 
requirements. In a traditional approach (non pattern-based 
approach) the developer would continue with the architecture 
design, module design, implementation and test. In our vision, 
instead of following these phases and defining new modeling 
artifacts, that usually are time and effort consuming, as well as 
error prone, the system developer merely needs to select 
appropriate patterns from the repository and integrate them in 
the system under development.
For  each  phase,  the  system  developer  executes  the
search/select from the  repository  to  instantiate patterns in 
its modeling environment (A4 and A9) and to integrate them 
in its models (A5 and A10) following an incremental process. 
The model specified in a certain activity is then used as an 
input work product in the following activities. Also, thanks to 
the system of patterns organization, the patterns identified in a
certain stage will help during the selection activity of the 
following phases. Moreover, the system developer can
develop their own solutions when the repository fails to 
deliver appropriate patterns at this stage. It is important to 
remark that the software designer does not necessarily need to 
use one of the artifacts stored in the repository previously 
included. He can define custom software architecture for some 
patterns (components), and avoid using the repository 
facilities (A6 and A11).
8
The repository system populated with S&D Patterns.
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Fig. 5.  The S&D pattern-based development process
Fig. 6. An example of a railway engineering process
V.APPLICATION DOMAIN EXAMPLE
SEMCO is an effective approach, relying on an MDE tool-
suite, to supporting secure and dependable system and 
software architecture engineering methodology and thus in our 
context supporting automated pattern-based building and 
access in industry
9
. We discuss the benefits, such as reduced 
modeling effort and improved readability, achieved when 
applying the methodology to an industrial case study. We have  
used  the  SEMCO modeling  framework to model and to 
analyze secure and dependable pattern- based  architectures  
for  an  application  acting  as  one  of the TERESA
demonstrators for the railway domain called Safe4Rail. 
Safe4Rail is in charge of the emergency brake of a railway 
system. Its mission is to check whether the brake needs to be 
activated. Most important, the emergency brake must be 
activated when something goes wrong.
A. The TERESA Repository
An instance of the Gaya repository called teresaRepository
was built in the context of the TERESA project to demonstrate 
reuse in a railway engineering environment and a metrology 
engineering environment. The railway and metrology domains 
analysis lead to identify a set of patterns to populate 
teresaRepository. We used the Tiqueo editor and Arabion
editor to create the corresponding property libraries and the set 
of patterns, respectively. Arabion use the property libraries 
provided by  Tiqueo to type the patterns property. Finally, we 
used the Gaya manager tool to set the relationships between 
the patterns.
The TERESA repository contains so far (on January 2014):? Compartments. 21 compartments to store artifacts of the 
TERESA domains.? Users. 10 users.? Property Libraries. 69 property model libraries.? Pattern Libraries. 59 patterns.
B. Application of the SEMCO Approach to a Railway 
System Case Study
Here, we examine the process flow for the example 
following the design process of Section IV-C and a very strict 
engineering process was followed, such as visualized in Fig.6,
where specific activities were performed in order to achieve 
certification using the presented approach (the numbers in 
parentheses correspond to the numbers in Fig. 5). In this case, 
SIL4 level is targeted.
Once the requirements are properly captured and imported 
into the development environment, the process can be 
summarized with the following steps:
Activity A2: Develop architecture model of a system: (A3) The
analysis of the requirements results in the needs of an 
architectural pattern for redundancy. Thus, activity (A4) is the 
instantiation of S&D patterns from the repository using the 
9
The approach is evaluated in the context of the
TERESA project (http://www.teresa-project.org/)
repository access tools. The running of the Retrieval tool using 
keywords Redundancy and SIL4, suggests to use a TMR
pattern at architecture level. In addition, some diagnosis 
techniques imposed by the railway standard are suggested, 
thanks to the repository structure and the support of the system 
of patterns organization for the railway application domain. 
(A5) Finally, at architecture level, we will integrate the 
following patterns: (a) TMR (searched by the System 
Architect), (b) Diagnosis techniques (suggested by the tool) 
and (c) Sensor Diversity (searched by the System Architect).
Activity A7: Develop design model of a system: This activity 
involves the development of the design model of the system. 
(A8) The analysis of the requirements the architecture model 
and the identified architectural patterns will help during the 
instantiation activity of the design phase (A9). Based on the 
selected patterns, the repository may suggest related or 
complementary patterns. For instance, if the TMR has been 
integrated, the following patterns may be proposed for the 
design model iteration: (d) Data Agreement, (e) Voter, (f) 
Black Channel and (g) Clock Synchronization.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
A Pattern Based System Engineering (PBSE) methodology 
based on a repository was specified. This engineering 
methodology fully takes into account the need for separation 
of roles by defining three distinct processes, the pattern 
modeling process, the repository specification process, and the 
pattern integration process. The implementation of a PBSE 
for S&D patterns is discussed in detail through a use case from 
railway domain.  A set of languages were specified for the 
specification of S&D patterns, of S&D properties, of 
processes, and of the repository structure and content. By 
developing an effective model- and pattern- based engineering 
approach, SEMCO will contribute to the establishment of 
security and dependability as an engineering discipline in the 
area of embedded systems.
Our objective is to design frameworks to assist system and 
software developers in the domain of security and safety 
critical systems to capture, implement and document 
distributed system applications. We worked on the “theory of 
how”. We addressed four fundamental questions: (1) what is 
design solutions for the precise and valuable specifications of 
patterns and how can a pattern be specified hierarchically with 
all its facets?  (2)  what is a repository of patterns, and how 
can repository be built and used to instantiate its content? (3) 
what is PBSE and (4) how can pattern be integrated into a 
system under development? We also worked on a “practice of 
how” by providing the SEMCO tool-chain.  We studied the 
first three questions, and we are now confronted with the 
fourth question. 
We plan to extend this work in the following directions: We 
will investigate new design techniques to improve the 
pattern’s representation to ease their integration in existing 
software engineering processes targeting secure and 
dependable architectures. Furthermore,  we  will  study  the  
relation of  our approach to  the  notion  of  pattern  systems  
for  security and safety  critical systems, as a first step for 
MBSA (Model Based Safety Analysis). We wish to promote a 
framework to define reference models and patterns (sub-
systems) for modeling and analysis of systems with strong 
security and safety requirements. The results will be provided 
in a SEMCO repository. 
We also aim to build an experimental study in part of a 
software development environment based on UML. This is to 
judge the relevance of the artifacts produced for the 
assessment process.
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